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Saving lives or saving societies? 
Realities of relief and reconstruction 
Many people that are coping to survive in war and disas-
ters not only have each other to lean on, but find addi-
tional relief in the protection, food and basic care provided 
by international aid. Once the emergency is over, more aid 
comes in yet moves away from individual people towards 
the major project of rebuilding society. The desire to assist 
people in need is as old as humanity. Babies have the in-
born empathie capacity of sensing other people's pains 
and every culture and religion has produced arrangements 
to protect the most vulnerable inside their community, to 
regulate violence and to contain war.1 The universal articu-
lation of this desire in International Humanitarian Law and 
its manifestation in global aid mechanisms is relatively new. 
Relief and reconstruction find their modern pedigree in 
events that continue to symbolize their practice. 
Modern humanitarian aid is set into motion by Henry 
Dunant, who after witnessing the unnecessary suffering at 
the battlefields of Solferino in 1859, initiated the Geneva 
Conventions and established the International Committee 
of the Red Cross. The basic principle of humanity is phrased 
by the Red Cross as "the desire to prevent and alleviate 
human suffering wherever it may be found". The catch-
words of the principle are in the words "wherever it may 
be found". Every social constellation has safety nets for its 
own needy, excluding others, yet here humanity is perceived 
as a universal whole, without distinguishing between 'uses' 
and 'thems'. Humanitarian aid is meant to be purely needs-
based: decisions to help must not be driven by political 
motives or by discrimination of any kind. 
Modern reconstruction finds its forebear in the ambi-
tious Marshall Plan following the Second World War. the 
Marshall Plan was part of an integrated programme for 
political reconstruction of Germany, the restoration of jus-
tice (through the Nuremberg Trials) and the economic recov-
ery of Europe. The 16 states involved in the Plan together 
received 11,8 Billion US$, which today would equal around 
100 Billion US$ plus additional loans. The Marshall Plan 
was a major success, being credited with a one third jump in 
European Gross National Product in 3 years and laying the 
foundation of the European Union.2 
Acts of assistance are never purely altruistic and we have to 
qualify the definitions of aid with their political sub-texts. The 
Marshall Plan was not only meant to help war-torn Europe, 
but explicidy designed to enhance security in Europe, con-
tain the spread of communism and create a viable economic 
counterpart to boost the American economy. Today's recon-
struction efforts are not dissimilar, and reconstruction assist-
ance finds an important motivation in deterring security 
threats of the assisting parties, more openly so since the start 
of the Global War on Terror in 2001. Humanitarian aid is 
also tainted by politics, which is amongst others visible from 
its skewed allocation, with only a fraction of funds going to 
large but neglected crises like in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and the uneven international preparedness to pro-
tect people against violence and hunger as demonstrated by 
the deplorable situation of the Palestinian people that suffer 
immensely from the international boycott against Hamas. 
Perceptions and response mechanisms of today's humani-
tarian aid and reconstruction continue to draw on their 
predecessors. Humanitarian policy aims to save lives, alle-
viate suffering and maintain human dignity during and 
in the aftermath of war and disasters à la Henri Dunant. 
Reconstruction policy is designed in the integrated and 
comprehensive Marshall tradition. It is guided by the con-
cept of human security, that after the long period of the 
Cold War, became the new expression of the UN founding 
missions of achieving 'freedom from want' as much as 'free-
dom from fear'.3 Reconstruction is defined as an integrated 
process designed to reactivate development, and at the same 
time create a peaceful environment.4 
The realities of humanitarian aid and reconstruction, on the 
other hand, have travelled quite away from these two mod-
els and have become highly diverse in terms of the actors 
involved and the scenes in which they take place. The core of 
my chair is to study the multiple realities of aid in humani-
tarian emergencies and reconstruction. 
Assistance in reconstruction and humanitarian aid are both 
criticized for their inability to adjust to local realities of 
emergency and post-emergency. This can be attributed to 
the organisation of aid and its built-in premises of what hap-
pens with societies during and after conflict. This is the twin 
logic that constructs crisis as a temporary and total disrup-
tion of society and reconstruction as restoring the normality 
of a neo-liberal modern state that democratically interacts 
with other constituent powers in society. A focus on mul-
tiple realities can deconstruct this logic and point out the 
continuities between crisis and normality. This has pardy 
been recognised in the recent attention for continuity in the 
use of violence and other threats to human security during 
periods of reconstruction. However, there is an other side 
to continuity which remains largely unnoticed. This is the 
continuity of the economies of survival, the remaining safety 
nets and sources of service delivery and the practices of local 
peace brokers that protect societies from total breakdown 
during crises and drive reconstruction processes when the 
room for manoeuvre opens up after crisis. Although the two 
sides of continuity are intertwined, they tend to be divorced 
in different bodies of policy and practice of humanitarian 
aid, the so-called classic relief and developmental relief. This 
distinction led to challenging debates in the 1990s, but 
this was unfortunately silenced after the start of the Global 
War on Terror in 1991.1 will elaborate how ensuing events 
have encouraged the aid system to stick to its old logics and 
organization, and argue that it is time to re-open this debate 
and explore how a focus on local practices can help to resolve 
the disconnect between emergency response and reconstruc-
tion. Because the foundations of relief and reconstruction 
are in war situations, these are given more attention, but 
when speaking of crisis I mean all humanitarian emergen-
cies, including natural disasters. 
(Dis) ordering processes of crisis and normality 
Emergency and reconstruction are sometimes clear-cut situ-
ations, but more often they are labels that are socially con-
structed. The declaration of a state of emergency can often 
be interpreted as an act of securitization providing a ratio-
nale for the militarization of governance and the suppression 
of democratic rights. Declaring the end of emergency and 
start of reconstruction can be equally controversial, as we 
witness in international debate over the question whether 
Iraq is in a process of reconstruction or in a state of war. 
In the Netherlands, the symbolic meaning of reconstruction 
played a decisive role in the political crisis over the decision 
to send a peacekeeping force to Uruzgan in Afghanistan. 
The government barely survived by assuring Parliament that 
the troops would enhance reconstruction, rather than fight-
ing the continued presence of the Taliban. This dominated 
political debate to the extent that members of parliament 
were bickering over the question if sewing clubs and other 
small projects organised by the peacekeepers could indeed 
pass the test for reconstruction or not. 
Empirically, the distinction between emergency and post-
emergency or as we call it the distinction between crisis and 
normality is hard to draw. Violent conflict has an enormous 
and traumatizing impact on societies, and people know the 
difference between war and peace very well. They resent 
researchers who sanitize their situation and euphemistically 
speak of conflict, food insecurity and gender-based violence 
when they really mean war, hunger and rape. But acknowl-
edging the suffering of war does not make the distinction 
between war and peace easier to draw. A peace agreement 
is an international marker of peace and sets into motion 
a reconstruction response. Yet, conflict does not operate 
according to a single logic, and its drivers, interests and 
practices are redefined by actors creating their localised and 
largely unintended conflict dynamics of varying intensity.5 
Crises are the outcome of conditions that build up over long 
periods of time and the transition to normality is also often 
marked by long periods of "no war no peace" situations. 
Violence and predatory behaviour may continue long after 
war is formally over.6 
In my view, the transition from normality to crisis and 
back entail new ways of ordering and disordering of spaces, 
power, regulation and interaction. Conflicts and disasters 
are breakpoints of social order, with a considerable degree of 
chaos and disruption, but they are also marked by processes 
of continuity and re-ordering, or the creation of new insti-
tutions and linkages. Much has been written, for example, 
about economies of war: the systems where the production, 
mobilization and allocation of resources are organized to 
sustain the violence.7 These economies are intricately linked 
to global networks of drugs, arms and human trafficking, 
until they surface in the normality of currency transactions. 
Although fully unfolding in war, these economies are the 
continuation of informal practices of globalized economies 
where violence regulates people's livelihoods without esca-
lating into full war.8 
On the other hand, we should not forget nor underestimate 
that there is a flip-side of war economies in the continu-
ation of the normality of economies of production, trans-
actions and distributions that we may call the economies 
of survival during crises.9 Although economies may largely 
collapse during war, people hold on to normality as much 
as they can and continue planting their fields and trading 
their products. The father who leaves his family in the safety 
of the refugee camp to cross back into the dangers of the 
war zone and harvest the remains of their fields is as much 
a face of war as the diamond smuggler or the mercenary. 
People in protracted crises want to make more out of their 
life than mere survival. I met families in South Sudan that 
walked for weeks to register in one of the refugee camps, not 
to find protection against violence but to give their children 
a chance to go to school. The two types of economies are 
deeply intertwined, and most activities are multi-faceted.10 
The woman who brews beer for soldiers or barters products 
with rebels to make ends meet also contributes to alcohol-
related insecurity and the maintenance of violence. Trucking 
companies supplying communities with food aid but taking 
a profit on the side by selling some of the relief-goods are 
a normal feature of crisis. Nonetheless, it would be a gross 
mistake to dismiss all economic activity during conflict as 
part of the war economy, and disrespect the creativity and 
perseverance people display to organize their own, their kin's 
and their neighbour's survival. Most theoretical perspectives 
have an exclusive focus on the logics of violence, survival 
or conflict resolution. By studying everyday practices, it 
becomes apparent how these logics are renegotiated in their 
local context and how they work upon each other. 
A similar argument can be made about social institutions of 
governance, security, justice and service delivery. Informal 
safety nets continue to be operative to some extent. Where 
national governments have collapsed or are party in the con-
flict, line ministries in many cases nonetheless continue to 
be responsive to people's needs, even though their services 
have become severely restricted. This can also be the case 
with parallel structures of rebel movements and even violent 
movements like Hamas nonetheless maintain service provi-
sions for their followers which sheds a different light on their 
popular base and embeddedness in society. In every conflict 
there are forces working to contain violence and forge peace. 
These are localized and informal activities that often draw 
on the social ties between people and perpetrators of vio-
lence to negotiate the release of prisoners or achieve a local 
cease-fire, yet sometimes grow into country-wide move-
ments like the Liberia Women's Initiative, that advocated 
peace since the beginning of the war until it turned into 
a country-wide movement enhancing women's roles in the 
post-war politics.11 The everyday realities of war are not all-
encompassing, and foregrounding war "risks disabling pre-
cisely the strategies and tools of social organization, culture 
and politics through which violence can be reduced and its 
adverse effects mitigated".12 
I conceive of aid as an integrated part of these everyday reali-
ties of crisis and post-crisis situations. Although aid volumes 
usually make up a very minor part of the resource flows in 
societies, in the locales of implementation, aid can strongly 
affect local power relations and (re)ordering processes. In 
line with the actor-oriented theory of Norman Long, I view 
aid interventions not as the chain of implementation of 
pre-defined plans but the negotiated product of a series of 
interfaces between different social fields,.13 As programmes 
gain meaning throughout formulation and implementation 
processes, they increasingly become part of local realities in 
many intended and unintended ways. 
Aid agencies are part of the field of actors that together con-
stitute the realities of crisis and survival, and the motives and 
attitudes of agencies deserve the same attention as the life-
worlds of local actors. Agency staff are local actors that play 
multiple roles in their society and bring broader politics to 
their work, as was most painfully demonstrated when devel-
opment agencies turned out to be one of the vehicles used to 
organize the Rwandan genocide.14 But also their role as serv-
ice provider can be problematic. The relation between service 
providers and receivers is unequal, and can easily foster an 
attitude whereby the service providers think for their clients 
and tend to perceive of their own significance as higher than 
their recipients give them credit for. When programmes fail, 
they first tend to blame this on the attitude of their clients.15 
Alternatively, (self) criticism through ritualized evalua-
tions usually leads to a list of issues to improve that require 
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continued and more intervention.16 Institutional interests 
to survive and expand always play a role in organizational 
strategies, and politics often hide behind more legitimate 
considerations.17 Agencies that write appeals on behalf of 
people in need, can have a second or perhaps first motiva-
tion in seeking their own survival. 
It is important to stretch the analyses of aid beyond sin-
gle programmes, and study the effect of the ensemble of aid 
establishments and interventions.18 We are used to conceive 
of the make-up of society as the relations between state, civil 
society, private sector and popular participation. The inter-
national aid establishments are left out of the equation, even 
though they have a strong and rather permanent presence 
in many places. It is hard to tell how the negotiations over 
power and social contracts would evolve without interna-
tional actors playing an intermediary or engineering role. 
The presence of aid effects the economy, it makes rents and 
market prices shoot up and the skewed salary structures 
of the parallel systems create social unrest and an artificial 
middle class. In Afghanistan a local employee of the UN 
or an INGO would earn up to 400 times more than his 
counterpart working in the government.19 This is not just 
a political economic problem. People who earn more con-
vince themselves they are worth more and start to feel supe-
rior. The people they work with resent this, and never really 
trust the Lords of Poverty.20 The result is a mutual sense of 
disrespect and it is important to take into account how this 
creeps into the interactions between aid workers and their 
environment. 
Everyday practices are our starting point to study the conti-
nuity and discontinuity in crisis and post-crisis and to unravel 
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the multiple realities of institutions and actors including aid 
establishments and interventions in the dynamics of vio-
lence, survival and conflict resolution. This approach allows 
us to document these dynamics, explain their contradictions 
and bring the different stories of local actors' perceptions, 
interests and concerns to the surface. Based on the study of 
everyday practice, we examine the multiple uses of policy 
notions and their discursive working in shaping reality and 
critically review the theoretical concepts that inform policy. 
For example, studying a resettlement programme that aimed 
to ease the tension between the Hutu and Tutsi population 
after the Rwanda genocide, we found that people locally 
perceived of the programme as just another imposition of 
a government that was urban-biased and failed to respect 
ordinary people. They found this more disturbing than their 
inter-ethnic community relations. Analyzing these different 
interpretations provided an important key to understand 
the dynamics of the programme and helped to reformulate 
ethnic relations in Rwanda in the context of urban-rural 
relations and patterns of governance.21 Studying everyday 
practice leads to developing new concepts and classifications 
that are empirically grounded and provide an interpretive 
frame for understanding the realities of humanitarian aid 
and reconstruction. 
Reconstruction 
In a country going through transition after conflict, recon-
struction finds its pace and shape. It is a fluid process, where 
social relations and the meaning of institutions are renegoti-
ated while people carefully probe their room for manoeuvre 
waiting if the conditions of relative peace will hold. When I 
was in Angola 6 months after the war, people seemed to just 
be waiting to find out what would happen to them. 4 years 
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later, I could almost taste reconstruction in the air. People 
clearly believed peace had settled in and despite the over-
whelming poverty, had started taking new initiatives, access-
ing new markets and services, and were busy discussing how 
they wanted their communities to look like. Every place 
has its own story of reconstruction. It follows from the pre-
conflict situation and what the conflict has done, and gets 
shaped within the confines of what the security situation 
allows and what opportunities open up. It is a process driven 
by social actors: people, government employees, organiza-
tions and businesses, re-establishing relations and reconfig-
uring hierarchies. Above all, recovery is a process that hap-
pens. Societies reconstruct, they are not being reconstructed, 
even though most writings make us believe that reconstruc-
tion is a project to completely renew and fix a country, like 
the Marshall Plan planned and driven by external aid. 
Reconstruction programmes have been part of the current 
international system since its inception after the second 
World War, for decades mainly couched in the frames of 
decolonization and cold war politics. Integrated approaches 
towards reconstruction like the Marshall Plan were revived 
after the fall of the Berlin wall, when the world thought it 
was ready for peace. The decade that followed was a major 
disillusion when many more conflicts erupted, which cre-
ated an image of the world as getting increasingly insecure. 
What has received much less attention is that many more 
conflicts have ended than begun: more than 100 between 
1989 and 2003. Even though around 30% of these have 
resumed within 5 years, this has still brought the total 
number of conflicts down considerably 22 and has created a 
vast demand for reconstruction. 
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Reconstruction programmes often refer back to the Marshall 
Plan, yet there are a number of important differences.23 The 
Marshall Plan targeted relatively well-established and wealthy 
democracies with a clear order to return to. Many countries 
presendy under reconstruction come from a period of fragile 
states and fragile economies, where the pre-conflict state is 
a major cause of conflict or is long forgotten. The financial 
commitment to the Marshall Plan was very large, whereas 
today despite the rhetoric on the importance of reconstruc-
tion for global security, commitments are much lower than 
pledged, and take long to materialise. The risk is real that 
by the time reconstruction can start in full swing the inter-
national attention has already shifted to the next big job. 
Unlike the Marshall Plan, that was led by the US, external 
reconstruction interventions now are multi-donor efforts, 
with a large role for the international financial institutions. 
This complicates coordination, as many actors formulate 
their own plan for the country. Coordination should ideally 
be forged by the new local authorities, but in practice donors 
and other interveners are reluctant to hand over control. 
Reconstruction in the 1990s was evaluated as being too 
much geared towards the quick introduction of formal 
democracy through elections.24 Reconstruction strategies 
have now shifted to a more balanced institutional approach 
aiming to simultaneously advance recovery in governance 
and participation; security; justice and reconciliation and 
socio-economic development. This can lead to dilemmas 
especially when contradictions occur between the domains. 
This is for example the case in the trade off between peace 
and justice. In most people's worldview, peace, justice and 
human rights belong together. In reality, there are tensions 
between them and the international community may pri-
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oritise stability over justice and human rights. One expla-
nation of the late response to atrocities in Darfur was that 
the international community did not want to address the 
human rights abuses in order not to jeopardize the peace 
process in South Sudan. Realising integrated reconstruc-
tion is not easy, especially when peace is not the beginning 
but meant to be the outcome of the reconstruction proc-
ess, like in Afghanistan. It requires good linkages between 
diplomatic, development and military endeavours, which is 
hampered by the fact that the aid world is organised around 
the axes of relief and development, with reconstruction fall-
ing in between. The modern development instruments, such 
as balance of payment support that are designed for stable 
environments and properly working governments are not 
suitable for reconstruction while relief does not tally with 
the wish to build institutions. 
Although reconstruction processes take place in many dif-
ferent contexts and situations25, Sultan Barakat concluded 
after comparative research that there is a recurrent pattern 
in reconstruction processes of using too short a time hori-
zon, of reducing reconstruction to a technical fix instead of a 
process of reshuffling state-society relations and power, and 
of leaving local people out of the equation.26 Reconstruction 
processes, are too oriented to national level reconstruction. 
This bears the risk of overlooking threats to people's security 
and the spoilers of reconstruction. Framing the problem in 
Afghanistan as a conflict against the Taliban, may for exam-
ple overlook the localised dynamics of complex ethnic rivalry 
compounded by competition over land.27 Localised security 
needs can also be different. Whereas national security may 
dictate a need for army reform, local women may prioritize 
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the development of a reliable police force, or the restoration 
of a credible court to setde disputes over property. 
Focusing on national reconstruction also bears the risk 
of overlooking and ignoring self-generated processes of 
reconstruction. An example may illustrate this point. In 
Afghanistan, the government insisted in 2003 that aid flows 
were channelled through their offices, instead of through 
the dominant presence of more than 2000 NGOs in the 
country. This claim seemed legitimate. One of the dilem-
mas of reconstruction is the pacing of institution building 
in relation to service delivery. Humanitarian needs continue 
for a long time, often increasing when refugees return, and a 
quick and visible improvement in service delivery is needed 
to create confidence in the peace process. However, when 
service delivery is done by INGOs, this may undermine the 
legitimacy of the state, and hinder its development because 
people prefer working for better paying NGOs.28 The prob-
lem in Afghanistan was framed in such a way that it made 
reconstruction a choice between two new strategies, the 
newly developed government versus the influx of interna-
tional NGOs. There was no room to acknowledge processes 
of reconstruction that were a continuation of service deliv-
ery under the Taliban regime by a number of local and inter-
national NGOs. As a result, these programmes increasingly 
came under financial pressure, and more importandy the 
valuable experiences accumulated over the years were not 
used as a springboard for reconstruction. 
A major reconstruction blunder along this line was the 
complete dismanding in 2003 of the Iraqis' army and the 
removal of all Ba'aht Party members from their offices, 
destroying in one strike the entire health and education sec-
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tors where employees had compulsory Party membership.29 
This was a major factor in the uncontrollable war that fol-
lowed, where now 50.000 people have been killed, up to 
600.000 more died as a result of the war, 3,5 million people 
are displaced while one third of the population suffers from 
food insecurity.30 
Overlooking localised reconstruction dynamics leads to the 
ignorance of those forces that created peace in the first place. 
The majority of conflicts that have ended in the past decade 
did so through negotiated settlement, not through victory, yet 
in many cases the groups that forged peace feel excluded from 
reconstruction processes. It also leads to the underestimation 
of resources and energies for reconstruction. It is only now 
that a trend starts to emerge to develop localised reconstruc-
tion programmes.31 This lack of attention for spontaneous 
reconstruction processes is pardy related, in my mind, to the 
underlying mindset that assumes that societies stop function-
ing during crisis or become totally emerged in the logic of 
conflict. It is important therefore to start the analysis of recon-
struction with the dynamics of responding to crisis. That takes 
me to the discussion of humanitarian aid. 
Humanitarian aid. 
The icon of humanitarian aid, Henri Dunant's International 
Committee of the Red Cross with its principles of neutral-
ity, impartiality and independence, was set up to provide 
medical care on the batdefields of Europe. The considerable 
humanitarian budgets of today are spent in a large variety of 
conditions: sudden onset natural disasters like the Tsunami 
and chronic food crises, such as the food aid that yearly eases 
the seasonal hunger gap of more than 5 million Ethiopians. 
It concerns sudden and massive refugee flows like the one 
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following the Rwandan genocide, as well as the care and 
maintenance of refugee camps that have existed for the past 
20 years. It is directed to protracted wars that have fallen in 
a rhythm of varying intensity throughout the seasons and 
areas as was the case in South Sudan, as well as to intense 
outbursts of violence where aid workers perform hit and 
run operations at great personal risk. Humanitarian budgets 
are also spent in post-conflict contexts to cater to ongoing 
humanitarian needs, deal with returning refugees and set 
out the first steps towards reconstruction. Despite the diver-
sification of aid, humanitarian debate and strategies do not 
differentiate much between these situations, although they 
set very different parameters to the provision of aid. The 
aid-architecture has remained largely the same, and funding 
cycles continue to be organised around short-cycle tempo-
rary measures, and a strict administrative separation of relief 
and development. An exception are situations of chronic 
food insecurity, where we increasingly see new forms of pro-
gramming that operate outside and across the boxes of relief 
and development throughout drought cycles. 
The vast majority of official humanitarian budgets are del-
egated to UN organizations like UNHCR, UNICEF and 
the World Food Programme. A significant share is spent by 
international NGOs. Among the thousands of INGOs, a 
few hundred have regular large-scale operations. Only few 
are purely humanitarian, the majority has additional man-
dates and a pedigree in faith-based charity or rights-based 
development. It is estimated that up to 90% of funds avail-
able for NGOs is spent by only a dozen titan NGO con-
federations or families, such as the Red Cross movement 
(actually not an NGO), World Vision, Care, Oxfam and 
MSF.32 This UN/ RedCross/ INGO whole forms the most 
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visible part of the humanitarian spectrum, and the almost 
exclusive focal point of attention of policy and debate on 
humanitarian aid. 
The spectrum is however much larger, and the picture more 
complicated. The survival, protection and relief of affected 
people rest in the first place in local hands. People help 
each other and find protection with local institutions and 
social networks. Diaspora initiatives, private funding and 
private initiatives from what I call the Non-Governmental 
Individuals make up an abundance of additional pro-
grammes, and so do non-registered humanitarian aid flows 
from other donors, including Islamic countries and China. 
In addition, it is good to remember that the Western brand-
ing of humanitarian aid does not mean aid is given by peo-
ple from the West. The more typical picture is a large staff of 
local people and a handful of expatriates, increasingly from 
non-Western countries, except that the decision making 
power, financial control, coordination and representations 
usually rests with these expatriates. 
Humanitarian aid has been strongly criticised since the 
1980s, starting with Barbara Harrell-Bond showing how 
the refugee regime makes people dependent and how part 
of this can be explained by the built-in anti-participatory 
ideology of the aid givers.33 This was soon followed by a 
seminal book of Alex de Waal on the negative side-effects 
of food aid, including the undermining the local markets 
and its use to fuel conflict.34 This kind of publications led to 
intense debate about the question how aid could avoid doing 
harm.35 Do no harm, however, has been understood in two 
ways that each imply an opposite solution. Do no harm can 
in the first place refer to avoiding the political abuse of aid, 
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as exemplified by the famous case of Riek Machar in South 
Sudan who deliberately kept a camp of underfed children to 
force agencies to provide his rebel forces with food.36 The 
1990s gave light to a number of influential studies focusing 
on the many large and small-scale ways in which aid can fuel 
economies of violence.37 The answer to this kind of harm 
is to minimize the impact of aid on society and restrict to 
strictly neutral service delivery, more or less according to the 
classic relief model of Henri Dunant. 
Do no harm can also refer to the tendency of aid to violate 
local structures and undermine local economic systems. 
There is an other body of research that confirms that when 
relief is given without recognizing people's own capacities, 
it can undermine and weaken them, leaving those whom 
it is intended to help worse off than they were before.38 
It is not just eroding peoples capacity, symbolized by the 
unnoticed doctors among refugee populations or the lazy 
and cheating beneficiary, but also undermining society. 
This means that aid may actually undermine the social 
networks that provide people with safety nets, civil soci-
ety, local business, markets and financial institutions, the 
public sector, and those local norms that institutionalize 
how people regulate conflict and protect and assist each 
other. Of course, this social fabric may be heavily eroded 
by conflict and (to a far lesser extent) disaster, but this 
can be worsened by aid that is insensitive to local reali-
ties.39 The answer to this type of harm is to maximize the 
engagement of aid with society and build more on existing 
institutions, the protection of social and economic systems 
and the linkage between relief and development processes. 
This type of aid can be labelled developmental relief. 
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The two types of aid: classic relief and developmental relief, 
correspond to the different faces of war that I have just 
described. The classic minimalist aid emphasizes the disrup-
tive characteristics of crisis and tends to assume that local 
institutions have ceased to exist or have been absorbed in the 
economy of violence. Although aid in this tradition is moti-
vated by the desire to relief suffering and based on the eth-
ics of a shared humanity, in practice it is basically delivered 
on the basis of mistrust of the society in which it operates 
and the providers of aid must be kept under close surveil-
lance. The developmental conception of aid focuses more on 
the image of continuity and on institutions that are geared 
towards the protection of people and the realization of peace. 
Aid is delivered on the basis of trust: entrusting people with 
the capacity to participate and encouraging service providers 
to creatively engage with local communities. 
Practices of developmental and classic relief 
In the course of the years, diverse bodies of humanitarian 
practice have evolved around these two types of aid. They 
are often considered to correspond with the mandate of 
agencies, with ICRC and MSF representing the more classic 
relief agencies. However, in practice contrasting approaches 
may be found among representatives of INGO families, 
and even within organisations where development divisions 
advocate a different approach to their humanitarian coun-
terparts. One of the markers of difference between the two 
approaches is the question whether agencies implement pro-
grammes direcdy, or work through implementing partners. 
This is in fact misleading, because of the different meanings 
that can be attached to partnership. Many agencies work 
with partners in an instrumental way, because the situation 
is too dangerous for international agencies like in Iraq or in 
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Somalia, or because of cost-efficiency when part of service 
delivery is sub-contracted to local agencies, without adjust-
ing the objectives of the relief operation.40 Developmental 
relief has a preference for working through local partners, 
but is much broader in aiming to overcome the artificial dis-
tinction between relief and development aid, in aiming to 
protect livelihoods instead of only saving lives, and in aim-
ing to safeguard and strengthen local capacities. 
The distinction between the two types of relief is difficult 
to draw, because most agencies have adopted the language 
of rights-based, partnered, participatory and accountable 
aid that is associated with developmental relief. The differ-
ences only become apparent in practice, as I may illustrate 
with experiences in Sri Lanka, where I accompanied a local 
humanitarian advocacy programme for the past two years.41 
Most agencies in the Tsunami response emphasized their 
rights-based approach. However, local staff observed that the 
rights-based approach of agencies was dividing people and 
communities. Tsunami survivors in Sri Lanka were educated 
about their rights and people s aid satisfaction was moni-
tored.42 It turned out that these initiatives defined people as 
clients of service providers, with consumer rights, instead of 
addressing them as citizens, with citizen rights. I came to see 
the distinction as crucial: making the difference of individu-
alizing and atomising aid, or embedding aid in local social 
structures, and making people responsible and in charge of 
their own disaster. People were not encouraged to act like 
citizens with entidements as well as moral obligations to 
play a role in the protection of more vulnerable people and 
the reconstruction of the community. Equipped with the 
language of consumer rights people simply demanded more 
aid and social conflicts over aid kept erupting. The rights-
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based approaches that were framed in a relation of service 
provider and clients, did not contribute to development aid 
in practice. Examples of a contrasting approach were rare, 
and included for instance a programme of a fisher associa-
tion that voluntarily committed to use part of the generated 
aid to establish a community solidarity fund.43 
Two complementary approaches? 
Classic and more developmental relief each have their own 
advantages and each bear particular risks. Developmental 
relief is geared towards the reduction of vulnerabilities yet 
is not without problems. Supporting local organisations 
and working through informal institutions can play into the 
politics of the conflict and lead to the exclusion of particu-
lar groups of people. Where local implementers are weak, 
developmental relief may jeopardize the very core business 
of humanitarian aid: the relief of suffering through serv-
ice delivery and when too many agencies all want to work 
with the same local partner, programmes may grow so fast 
that the local organisation gets destroyed in downward spi-
rals of quarrels and corruption.44 Classic forms of relief are 
criticised for undermining local people and institutions, but 
are crucial for getting large life-saving operations running 
within a matter of days. The neutrality of the operations can 
enhance the needs-based character of aid and help agencies 
to stay out of political trouble. 
A case can be made to state that the co-existence of classic 
and developmental relief results in a diversity that enriches 
the aid response, and is complementary. A division of labour 
implicidy arises where in the more security-tense and fluid 
contexts classic relief prevails, while in more relaxed situa-
tions developmental approaches can flourish. This could be 
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captured in a strategy to have classic relief where it is needed 
and encourage developmental relief where it is possible. In 
reality, however, it appears that agencies, due to a combi-
nation of deeply set cultural patterns and organizational 
interests, are not very self-reflective about the need to adjust 
styles to conditions. One of the major complaints of people 
in the Tsunami affected areas was that the humanitarians 
who came, were totally unaware of operating in functioning 
societies and behaved as if they were in Darfur or Somalia 
(sic!).45 In the long-term setting of Kakuma refugee camp, 
where the levels of crime and violence are probably lower 
than anywhere in the wider region, Bram Jansen found that 
agencies continued to enclose themselves in a compound 
while considering the camp too dangerous to allow any 
informal interaction between staff and refugees. 
A recurring problem is that classic relief aid tends to have 
a blind eye for local actors and institutions. When I was 
in Darfur in 2005, I met several agencies working in a 
developmental relief style, for instance by working with the 
government health services: managing despite the adverse 
conditions to keep a number of government clinics run-
ning. Most agencies, however, worked in the classic relief 
style, which was necessary as the needs surpassed what exist-
ing institutions could handle. But was it also necessary to 
maintain an isolation from society? In one of the provincial 
towns that had not yet come under attack local agencies that 
had been running development programmes before the war 
were idly standing by and watching how relief agencies had 
taken over the town. It took 18 months before they were 
invited to take part in coordination meetings. One of these 
local NGOs had formed women's groups in the context of 
an environmental programme before the war. These women 
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groups had informally re-assembled around their leaders in 
the camps after displacement. The international agencies 
were not aware of this, and had been busy considering how 
to organise women themselves. There was also a group of 
young medical doctors that had been campaigning against 
female circumcision and sexual abuse, out of medical and 
ethical more than feminist concerns. They had not been 
consulted by any of the respected UN and relief organiza-
tions to help with the gender programmes that agencies had 
formed to protect women against sexual violence around 
the camps. When we discussed this, the agencies dismissed 
the information by stating that these doctors were govern-
ment doctors and hence could not be trusted. This distrust 
was expressed and accepted as a self-evident fact that needed 
no further explanation. This had nothing to do with time 
limitations in the heat of emergency. Mathijs van Leeuwen 
found the same attitude among INGOs that had been active 
for more than 15 years in Southern Sudan! 
The disengagement of classic relief from the society in which 
it operates, has increased since the start of the Global War 
on Terror, which has made security an overriding concern of 
aid agencies. The security of aid personnel and protection 
of the operation has become an important operational issue 
in those crises where aid agencies risk to be associated with 
the Western alliances that started the war. In Iraq, the Red 
Cross and United Nation buildings have been bombed and 
64 known and perhaps many more unknown aid workers 
have been killed over the past 4 years46. The discussions trig-
gered by Afghanistan and Iraq have spilled over to dominate 
all domains of aid. The idea has become widespread that 
providing aid is a dangerous occupation. Research does not 
confirm this. If Iraq is left out of the equation, the number 
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of war-casualties amongst aid workers has remained rela-
tively constant over the past decade.47 Feinstein research 
indicates that in some cases, particularly in Burundi and 
Sierra Leone, there has been an over-securitization which 
has further restricted the interaction between personnel 
of the UN and many NGOs and local people and institu-
tions.48 Although this research does not capture the experi-
ence of agencies that continued their developmental relief, 
for instance with a programme that upheld the governmen-
tal health services in large parts of Burundi, it remains a fact 
that humanitarian workers in many parts of the world feel 
that the relationship with local populations is deteriorating. 
The litde research done on the topic indicates that often it is 
not the perceived political association of aid with the West 
that puts people off, but a more generalised reaction against 
the cultural distance between the Toyota driving aid work-
ers and local people. This implies that in many places aid 
should invest in trust more than in security. There are many 
trust-forgers that work differendy in different contexts.49 
Sometimes strict neutrality, isolation and highly protective 
measures are necessary, in most areas good relations with 
partner organizations, displaying confidence in local staff, 
respectful behaviour and accountability pay off more in 
terms of security than the use of heavily armed guards. 
Re-opening the debate on developmental relief 
In the 1990s there has been much debate over the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches of clas-
sic and developmental relief. In the case of natural disasters, 
the debate question seems largely resolved, at least at the 
paradigmatic level. There is a broad consensus that the pri-
ority should be with enhancing local capacities for disaster 
preparedness and response. The evidence that preparedness 
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helps, for example by spectacularly reducing the cyclone-
related death tolls in Bangladesh and the Caribbean, seem to 
have turned the tide.50 Over the last four decades, the yearly 
average number of disasters has more than doubled, yet the 
average number of deaths has been reduced by half, which is 
largely due to preparedness measures.51 In the case of con-
flict, the question if aid must concentrate on saving lives or 
whether there is a case for more developmental approaches 
has not been resolved, but was taken over by events. Since 
the Global War on Terror, humanitarian debate has focused 
more on the question how to relate to the occupying powers 
in Afghanistan and Iraq than on how to relate to society. The 
phrase of linking relief to development is now exclusively 
used to denote the transition from crisis to post-crisis, but 
is hardly used to refer to the challenge to make aid during 
crisis more developmental. 
While the debate has been largely silenced, this is not a 
silence that implicidy accepts the validity of both approa-
ches as they continue in practice. Instead, the coordination 
and financing system of humanitarian aid is consolidating 
its organization along the objectives and organisation of the 
externally-driven minimal relief approach of classic relief. 
In a recent reform meant to rule the increasingly unruly 
humanitarian actors, the coordination structure of the UN 
is organized along sectoral lines with clusters for food, shel-
ter, water and sanitation, etcetera. In this technocratic set-
up, integration and local control over the response process 
are secondary principles of coordination at best.52 The pro-
cess by which needs are defined and programmes financed 
tilts heavily towards a minimalist approach. Humanitarian 
appeals formulate relief provisions that are needed (for food 
aid, water and sanitation, shelter and so forth) but these are 
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not analysed in conjunction with capacities and livelihood 
opportunities. Ambitions for developmental relief are impli-
cidy considered additional objectives that agencies must 
finance by their own means as budgets are largely reserved 
for strict life saving service delivery. In 1996 Jan Pronk made 
an appeal to his colleagues in the donor community to cre-
ate pockets of development in conflict, which was inspired 
by the situation in Sudan where despite the war, many areas 
stayed relatively peaceful for long periods of time.53 Yet, 
official humanitarian objectives and flows of funding have 
stayed within the confines of saving lives, instead of protec-
ting livelihoods to enable people to cope during conflict.54 
Donors refused, for example, to contribute to veterinary 
services because they were not part of the core life-saving 
package. Since pastoralism is the main livelihood in South 
Sudan, the increase in cattle diseases effectively turned more 
people dependent on food aid than was necessary on account 
of the conflict. Even disaster preparedness, despite the com-
mon acceptance of its importance is not covered under most 
humanitarian budgets. Since disaster preparedness is also 
not part of development objectives, agencies working on 
preparedness continue to find it difficult to secure funding. 
With regard to reconstruction, the present organization of 
relief by maintaining a separation between crisis and nor-
mality, is more constraining than facilitating the transi-
tion towards reconstruction. Developmental relief that can 
anticipate on reconstruction continues in practice, yet is 
relegated to shadows of the aid system. Even the agencies 
engaged in more developmental relief have largely reduced 
the discussion to the question of implementation by local 
organizations. It is time to define what the parameters of 
developmental relief are and resume a critical reflection on 
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its practices and possibilities in emergency situations.55 It 
is time to make some policy choices about the desirability 
and feasibility of developmental relief. In most situations an 
explicit preference and space for developmental relief could 
make a major difference for people struggling to protect 
their livelihoods and social safety nets in times of emergency. 
Let us not forget that the transition from relief to develop-
ment is an optimistic slogan that does not apply to most 
people in emergency situations.56 Their normality is not one 
of development but of bare survival, with few services to fall 
back on. Their return to normality is not a transition from 
relief to development but a transition from relief to mud-
dling through. Safeguarding the meagre livelihood, safety 
nets and service options of these people should be a major 
driving force of humanitarian aid. 
Our research agenda 
The independence of aid is seen as a major condition for 
its quality. It is rarely understood that the same applies for 
research. By far most research on aid is based on commis-
sioned consultancy work. This can be high quality, but often 
leads to the omission of critical findings and rarely allows 
for research that is in-depth and embedded in peoples life-
worlds. Research on aid tends to be strongly informed by the 
politics of the latest disaster, with few research programmes 
capable to unravel the continuities and discontinuities in the 
realities behind these politics. 
My research group has a number of programmes that aim to 
understand the working of aid interventions in their envi-
ronment. This research focuses especially on programmes 
that link emergency response with development, peace and 
(social) security programming. We currently do research into 
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community-driven disaster preparedness, reconstruction and 
peace building in the Philippines, Afghanistan, Indonesia, 
Mozambique, Guatemala and the Great Lakes Region. 
Success and failure of developmental relief and reconstruc-
tion is produced throughout policy chains and depends on 
functional linkages with related domains of intervention. 
Our research moves up, down and sideways of policies, and 
analyzes how these different linkages work in practice and 
affect the chances for emergency response and reconstruc-
tion. Together with the Law and Governance group we are 
preparing research to study practices of how food aid dur-
ing emergency situations is organised to enhance develop-
ment and (social) security. These researches start inside a 
programme, and stretch outside as far as needed, often trav-
elling along multiple sites and applying a range of methods. 
We also have have research that focuses in the first place 
on the multiple realities outside of aid interventions. Aid 
interventions play a role in research, primarily as spaces 
where people manoeuvre to realize their own projects and to 
study the impact of the ensemble of interventions in society. 
PhD work in Kakuma Refugee Camp explores how refu-
gees manage to take over and alter to a large extent the grid 
of control that is seemingly exercised by the UNHCR and 
the Kenian authorities, creating their own powerful realities 
for (re) distributing jobs and other resources. Research in 
Angola ambitiously reconstructs how people organised their 
lives and communities in the different periods of consecu-
tive wars and how aid affected these processes. This type of 
research requires long periods of immersion in local com-
munities and relies mostly on ethnography. 
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Finally, we do research that focuses inside the policies and 
practices of humanitarian and development agencies. It 
partly springs off our academic research, and is enhanced 
by a range of activities varying from evaluations, contract 
research, seminars and advice work. It is about strategy, prin-
ciples and praxis of aid. Topics include the use of the Code 
of Conduct, issues of coordination, organizational culture, 
beneficiary participation, complaint handling, gender and 
disaster preparedness. Much of this work is done in part-
nership with NGOs and facilitated by PSO, a membership-
based capacity building organization. Our latest project is to 
organize a peer review on humanitarian partnerships. This 
summer, agency staff will do fieldwork in different coun-
tries to compare how they and their colleagues relate to local 
implementing partners. 
Most of our research is interactive in nature, and is done in 
close dialogue with societal stakeholders. Interactive research 
offers many analytical and practical advantages, yet also bears 
the risk to be biased towards realities of intervening agencies 
more than people. Gemma van der Haar is presendy docu-
menting our experiences with interactive research. One of 
the major findings is that it is crucial to maintain a solid 
body of financially independent, in-depth research into the 
realities of disaster, conflict and reconstruction to feed and 
critically interrogate the findings of more applied research. 
We hope to foster this academic tradition by organising 
the first World Congress of Humanitarian Studies in 2009, 
together with the universities of Groningen and Bochum. 
Humanitarian movement. 
Mister rector, ladies and gendemen, I am very glad the world 
community has invented humanitarian aid. Countless num-
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bers of people have found survival through the protection, 
refuge and relief offered by humanitarians. Humanitarian 
ideals have inspired the social movement of the Red Cross, 
with a global membership of hundred million people, and 
they find daily expression in the work of thousands of com-
mitted and idealistic humanitarian workers. 
Humanitarian emergencies will continue to be part of our 
future. We already see the numbers of natural disasters 
sharply rising and if nothing is done about climate change, 
the Stern report predicts 200 million people will be displaced 
by the end of this century due to sea-level rise. Many people 
will have to survive in increasingly inhabitable places, where 
they live in conditions of chronic food insecurity without the 
assets to catch up with the globalized economy. We cannot 
predict the courses of conflict, but even without large-scale 
wars, patterns of structural, criminal and political violence 
will continue to create pockets of misery and abuse. The 
different trends signal a world where humanitarian needs 
become more chronic and large scale. The present humani-
tarian apparatus that is designed to provide a temporary stop 
gap to alleviate suffering in war and disaster, may be increas-
ingly inadequate to deal with these challenges. What will be 
the safety nets for the majority of people that are excluded 
from the benefits of globalization and those that are finding 
their livelihoods destroyed because of climate-related envi-
ronmental depletion? 
When we stop thinking of crises as temporary problems, and 
recognise the continuity in people's vulnerability for conflict 
and disaster, the need becomes more urgent to think outside 
of the boxes of humanitarian aid and development, and seek 
more durable ways to make communities resilient, while 
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upholding the resolve to protect people that need help for 
their immediate survival. In his time, Henri Ounant was a 
visionary but not a very radical thinker. He advocated in the 
1860s for the alleviation of life-threatening suffering in the 
charity tradition of the Good Samaritan, while his contem-
porary Karl Marx had just written the Communist Manifest 
envisioning a global regime change to eradicate poverty 
and related suffering. In these days, upholding the ideal of 
humanity: "to relieve suffering wherever it may be found" 
begs increasingly radical action to reduce people's vulner-
abilities and resolve the threats against human security. 
I do believe that we must muster the individual and political 
will to increasingly share resources with people in need. But 
help can only be effective when the agency and acting capac-
ity of the recipients of aid are acknowledged and respected. 
Providing relief marks solidarity but it also marks superior-
ity: it defines 'the other' as victim and the assister as the 
one who determines what help is in order. The victims sole 
attribute is found in his suffering, and although the assister 
grants him the right to survival, the victim is stripped of the 
capacity to act that would recognise him as a fellow human 
being.57 It is not in their suffering that we can know people, 
we can only reach out by respecting peoples dignity as actors 
that own their lives and futures. 
Thank you 
Combining academic and family life is often not unlike a 
humanitarian emergency and I am sure I would not have 
survived without the help so many of you have extended to 
me. My first and biggest thank you goes to Fred Claasen, 
my wonderful husband and intellectual sparring partner, 
who generously provides me with the most basic need of 
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love. Iana, Ellis, Franka and Don, together with our moth-
ers, family and friends, with special mention for Renske 
Schamhart, Marie Jose Vervest and my cousin and name-
sake Thea Hilhorst, form the homely shelter that help us to 
sustain the most extreme conditions. I am most grateful to 
Georg Frerks, Gemma van der Haar, Mathijs van Leeuwen, 
Bram Jansen, Annelies Heijmans, Hilde van Dijkhorst, 
Maliana Serrano, Luis Artur, Jeroen Warner, Rens de Man, 
Lucie van Zaaien and Jos Michel. They are my colleagues 
and friends at Disaster Studies, who kindly share their daily 
rations of food-for-thought-aid. The good work relations 
combined with lots of fun provide the perfect mental health 
care to sustain the hardships of academic life, with Lucie as 
the most loyal and effective disaster manager. We all know 
that social networks are crucial for surviving, and I am 
deeply grateful for the many people I am fortunate enough 
to work with, here in Wageningen, especially with the Rural 
Development Group where my chair has found refuge, in 
the CERES research school, and in the many organizations 
in the Netherlands and internationally. I look forward to 
continue working with you. There is no programme without 
donors, and I do thank the science councils of WOTRO 
and NWO for enabling so much of our research and the 
Foundation Nationaal Erfgoed Hotel de Wereld for spon-
soring my chair. 
Finally, I would like to thank Wageningen University that 
has invested trust in me and endowed me with this esteemed 
position. Kees Schuyt considers the institute of an independ-
ent scientific academe as one of the major social inventions 
to advance societies and protect them against cycles of exclu-
sion and conflict escalation.58 I feel proud to be part of the 
ranks of this academe. I was raised by my parents with the 
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strong persuasion that gifts cannot be appreciated lightly, 
but create social responsibility too. I will do the utmost to 
live up to the confidence all of you are giving me today, and 
thank you for your attention. 
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